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In the decades following World War II American corporations domi-
nated world markets, U.S. per capita income increased, and the distribu-
tion of income showed continual improvement. It appeared that the
American economy had achieved sustainable prosperity—the pro g re s-
sive spreading of the benefits of economic growth to more people over a
prolonged period of time. But in the past 20 years well-paid and secure
jobs have been disappearing—the victims, corporate executives say, of
global competition—and the income gap is now widening, with those at
the lower end and also in the middle of the income distribution seeing a
drop in real income and mounting employment insecurity. In trying to
find out what has gone wrong with the American economy, Researc h
Associates William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan put the spotlight on
the governance and employment practices of the American corporation.
Lazonick and O’Sullivan assert that American corporations are being
hurt not by low wage scales in other countries, but by their own failure
to invest in the organizational learning required to sustain competitive
advantage. While their foreign competitors invest in the collective and
cumulative learning that can generate the higher- q u a l i t y, lower- c o s t
p roducts that result in a competitive edge, U.S. corporations have
become increasingly segmented, with skill investment concentrated in
upper levels of the corporate hierarc h y, functions compart m e n t a l i z e d ,
and strategic decision making vested in high-level managers who are
isolated from the organizational learning process. While their fore i g n
competitors are oriented toward value creation (allocating corporate
resources to innovative investment strategies), U.S. corporate managers
have become oriented toward value extraction (allocating re s o u rces to
provide high returns to stockholders). To return to competitive success
and the promise of sustainable prosperity requires that U.S. corporations
reform their corporate governance system. Corporations must invest in
broader and deeper skill bases; they must have managers who have the
ability and incentive to commit financial re s o u rces to collective and
cumulative learning processes. 
The debate over corporate governance has been dominated by 
p roponents of stockholder control, who argue that managers’ first
c o n c e rn should be the interests of the stockholders, with the primary,
and perhaps only, goal being immediate re t u rns on investments. 
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finance and saving on yields from stock and the immense growth of
institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds put pressure on
managers to create a large cash flow out of the organization.
Proponents of managerial control hold that the influence of stockholders
should be reduced and managers should be given more autonomy to
make developmental investments. Lazonick and O’Sullivan counter that
such re f o rms in themselves will not result in competitive advantage.
Managers must have both the ability to make strategic investments in
innovation—an ability that can be acquired only through their integra-
tion into organizational learning processes—and the incentive to make
those decisions. Many U.S. managers are “generalists” who lack special-
ized knowledge of their corporation’s products, production processes, and
problems. The widespread practice of tying managers’ income to stock-
holder re t u rn encourages them to favor financial liquidity and value
extraction over financial commitment and reinvestment in the develop-
ment of the corporation.
Some observers propose that the problems of corporate governance and
industrial development can be solved by recognizing the claims on
corporate re t u rns of stakeholders other than stockholders, such as
employees. But these stakeholders may have no more ability or incentive
to invest in innovation than stockholders or managers. While re c o g-
nizing individual contributions to the corporation and the need for
investment in productive assets, the stakeholder perspective offers no
understanding of the collective character of corporate investment and
may offer no alternative to extracting returns from past activities.
Lazonick and O’Sullivan conclude that in order for U.S. corporations to
remain competitive, the corporate governance system must be based on
a concept of innovative enterprise—a concept of “org a n i z a t i o n a l ”
c o n t rol, rather than stockholder, managerial, or stakeholder contro l .
Strategic decisions must be made by participants in the corporation who
are integrated into the organizational learning processes that enable an
enterprise to develop and utilize products and technologies better than
its competitors. In the long run the innovative enterprise benefits not
just itself but the economy. It is innovative investment that makes
corporate returns sustainable into the future, and corporate competitive
advantage in the market contributes to making sustainable pro s p e r i t y
possible in the nation. 
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result in greater cost efficiencies for American firms, could they now be
paying a price for following low-road management practices? For more
than 10 years—certainly for a time predating the current expansion—
firms have been facing a shortage of skilled workers, yet they seemingly
have not altered their long-term investment strategies to adjust for this
deficit. Corporate emphasis on cost reduction has left many workers
feeling insecure, has caused a deterioration in employees’ loyalty to their
f i rm, and has resulted in a high level of job turnover among skilled
workers. All of this has occurred in a climate of increased global compe-
tition in which the United States is no longer the world’s only economic
l e a d e r, a climate that will only intensify if and when the Euro p e a n
Union becomes a reality.
It would appear that American corporations must alter their long-term
investment strategies or continue to lose share in the global market-
place. As Research Associates William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan
note, U.S. corporations tend to adopt short - t e rm investment strategies—
with a primary, or solitary, goal of providing stockholders with quick
re t u rns. Foreign competitors, on the other hand, have long-term invest-
ment strategies that focus on improving the innovative skills of
employees throughout the corporation. This improvement in collective
l e a rning and innovation enables foreign firms to produce better- q u a l i t y
p roducts at lower cost. And this ability makes it possible for them to
outcompete American firm s .
Lazonick and O’Sullivan warn that if American corporations do not
alter their investment strategies to take a long-term view that focuses on
7 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
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employee development, they will not survive. Corporate surv i v a l
re q u i res a change in the governance of American corporations that
places decision-making power with all those who contribute to the
c o r p o r a t i o n ’s production and innovation. This change in govern a n c e
requires that the power of stockholders to extract value from the corpo-
ration be curbed. If control of corporations remains in the hands of those
who seek only their own financial gain from the corporation, the
American corporation will be unable to compete in the global economy.
Moreover, firms will find it increasingly difficult to find and retain the
skilled workforce they require in the current age of rapid technological
advance. And the failure of U.S. corporations will hamper policy efforts
aimed at improving the lives of Americans, because the loss of corpora-
tions will result in the continued and even increasing loss of well-paying,
secure jobs.
Lazonick and O’Sullivan’s recommendations provide a course of action
that will re q u i re much corporate willpower, but could set the United
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The Disappearance of Good Jobs in the American Economy
Can the American economy achieve sustainable prosperity—a progres-
sive spreading of the benefits of economic growth to more and more
people over a prolonged period of time? During the first half of the twen-
tieth century, despite the debacle of the Great Depression, the United
States emerged as the world’s most powerful industrial nation. In the
post–World War II decades, the United States had not only by far the
world’s highest per capita income, but also a distribution of income that,
until the early 1970s, showed continual improvement. Since then Japan
has mounted a dramatic challenge to the economic leadership of the
United States, while the U.S. income distribution has become increas-
ingly unequal (Maddison 1994; Danziger and Gottschalk 1996). A
re p o rt from  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and
Development shows that in the 1980s, of all the advanced industrial
economies, the United States had the widest income gap between the
rich and poor (Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995).
It is not only those at the bottom of the income distribution who are
losing out. A distinctive dimension of growing income inequality in the
United States has been a drop in the real income of those in the middle
of the income distribution—what many have called “the vanishing
middle class” (Harrison and Bluestone 1988). Adjusted for inflation, the
median income of American employees in the mid 1990s was some 5
percent lower than it was in the late 1970s. Yet since the early 1970s the
American economy has grown at an average annual rate of well over 2
p e rcent. Why has such a small pro p o rtion of Americans, perhaps only
Corporate Governance and
Employment: Is Pro s p e r i t y
Sustainable in the United States?
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the top 20 or 30 percent of the income distribution, been sharing in 
this growth? 
A major cause of the growing inequality in income distribution has been
the disappearance of “good jobs” in the American economy. These are
jobs with major corporations that provide a high standard of living in
terms of earnings, employment stability, and benefits for sickness and old
age. The widespread availability and economic viability of these good
jobs in the past provided the foundation for sustainable prosperity in the
United States. The disappearance of such jobs has placed sustainable
prosperity in considerable jeopardy.
G o ods jobs have been under pre s s u re since the 1970s and have been
disappearing rapidly since around 1980.
1 The phenomenon is structural,
not cyclical. Hundreds of thousands of stable and well-paid blue-collar
jobs that were lost in the recession of 1980 to 1982 were never restored.
Between 1979 and 1983 the number of people employed in the economy
as a whole increased by 377,000, or 0.4 percent, while employment in
durable goods manufacturing—which supplied most of the good blue-
collar jobs—declined by 2,023,000, or 15.9 percent (Council of
Economic Advisers 1992, 344). 
Indeed, the “boom” years of the mid 1980s saw hundreds of major plant
closings. Between 1983 and 1987 4.6 million workers lost their jobs, 40
p e rcent of which were in the manufacturing sector (Herz 1990, 23;
Staudohar and Brown 1987; Patch 1995). The elimination of these well-
paid and stable blue-collar jobs is reflected in the decline of the propor-
tion of the manufacturing labor force that is unionized—from 47.4
percent in 1970 to 27.8 percent in 1983 to 18.2 percent in 1994 (U.S.
D e p a rtment of Commerce 1975, 371; 1995, 444; U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1976, 137). 
T h roughout the 1980s American corporations displayed a mounting
p redilection for “downsizing.” Not only blue-collar workers were
a ffected. Professional, administrative, and technical personnel experi-
enced a significant share of the elimination of previously stable and
remunerative jobs. For example, a Business Week cover story of August
1986, entitled “The End of Corporate Loyalty?” observed that “cutbacks
a re becoming a way of life even in healthy companies” (Nussbaum
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sands of managerial positions were eliminated and, like the earlier blue-
collar losses, apparently on a permanent basis. Blue-collar workers
continued to bear the brunt of displacement, but the dismissal of white-
collar employees became more prevalent. In 1982 the rate of unemploy-
ment of professional, administrative, and technical employees was 37
p e rcent of the rate of unemployment of all employees; in 1994 that
figure was 44 percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1985, 408; 1995,
421).
Leading the downsizing of the 1980s and 1990s were many of America’s
largest corporations. From 1990 to 1995 the number of employees of the
50 U.S. companies with the greatest sales volume declined by almost 13
p e rcent, even though the pro p o rtion of sales to U.S. gross national
p roduct accounted for by these companies declined by less than 1.5
p e rcent (see Table 1). Of the 21 U.S. industrial corporations that in
1990 each employed more than 100,000 people, 17 companies
(employing 3.4 million people worldwide) downsized in the 1990s and
had by 1995 reduced their net combined employment by over 700,000,
or by about 21 percent, from the 1990 levels (see Table 2).
A good indicator of decline in stable and remunerative employment is
the extent to which employers give managers and workers access to sick-
ness and old age benefits. In 1960 only 11 percent of the civilian labor
force had group health plans. By 1970 this proportion had increased to
Corporate Governance and Employment: Is Prosperity Sustainable in the United States?
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Table 1  Total Employment and Sales as a Percentage of GNP, 50 U.S.
Industrial Corporations with Largest Sales, 1954–1995
Annual Average  Sales as Percentage
Year Employees Percentage Change of GNP
1 9 5 4 3 , 7 2 9 , 0 9 7 —  1 8 . 8 3
1 9 5 9 4 , 0 8 7 , 8 6 4 0.46  1 9 . 9 3
1 9 6 9 6 , 3 6 6 , 9 0 4 4.53  2 1 . 6 9
1 9 7 9 6 , 2 0 3 , 7 8 5 –0.25  2 9 . 8 1
1 9 9 0 5 , 8 2 1 , 3 0 0 –0.57  2 3 . 4 1
1 9 9 3 5 , 1 6 9 , 1 2 8 –3.73  2 0 . 7 0
1 9 9 5 5 , 0 7 9 , 7 4 7 –0.86  2 1 . 9 9
Note: Figures are for worldwide employment and sales.
Source: “The Fortune 500," Fortune, various issues.
PPB No.37  2/18/99  2:08 PM  Page 11Investment in Innovation
Public Policy Brief 12
30 percent and by 1980 to 62 percent. Yet by 1994 only 53 percent of
employees had health benefits paid by employers. A similar trend can be
seen in pension funds run by employers or unions. In 1960 24 percent of
the civilian labor force had such benefits, in 1970 32 percent, and in
1980 45 percent. By 1994 this pro p o rtion had declined to 41 perc e n t .
This decline in benefits occurred for all occupational classifications. For
example, comparing 1982 and 1993, coverage by group health plans
dropped from 72 percent to 61 percent for semiskilled workers, from 76
p e rcent to 57 percent for skilled workers (precision production, craft,
and repair employees), and from 76 percent to 67 percent for managerial
Table 2  Net Employment Change of U.S. Industrial Corporations with 
over 100,000 Employees in 1990, 1990–1995
E m p l o y m e n t P e rc e n t
E m p l o y e e s , E m p l o y e e s , C h a n g e , C h a n g e ,
C o m p a n y 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 0 – 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 0 – 1 9 9 5
General Motors 7 6 1 , 4 0 0 7 0 9 , 0 0 0 – 5 2 , 4 0 0 – 6 . 9
F o rd 3 7 0 , 4 0 0 3 4 6 , 9 0 0 – 2 3 , 4 1 0 – 6 . 3
I B M 3 7 3 , 8 1 6 2 5 2 , 2 1 5 – 1 2 1 , 6 0 1 – 3 2 . 5
P e p s i c o
a 3 0 8 , 0 0 0 4 8 0 . 0 0 0 1 7 2 , 0 0 0 55.8 
General Electric 2 9 8 , 0 0 0 2 2 2 , 0 0 0 – 7 6 , 0 0 0 – 2 5 . 5
United Te c h n o l o g i e s 1 9 2 , 6 0 0 1 7 0 , 6 0 0 – 2 2 , 0 0 0 – 1 1 . 4
Philip Morr i s 1 6 8 , 0 0 0 1 5 1 , 0 0 0 – 1 7 , 0 0 0 – 1 0 . 1
B o e i n g 1 6 1 , 7 0 0 1 0 5 , 0 0 0 – 5 6 , 7 0 0 – 3 5 . 1
du Pont 1 4 3 , 9 6 1 1 0 5 , 0 0 0 – 3 8 , 9 6 1 – 2 7 . 1
Eastman Kod a k 1 3 4 , 4 5 0 9 6 , 6 0 0 – 3 7 , 8 5 0 – 2 8 . 2
C h ry s l e r 1 2 4 , 0 0 0 1 2 6 , 0 0 0 2 , 0 0 0 1 . 6
Digital Equipment 1 2 4 , 0 0 0 6 1 , 7 0 0 – 6 2 , 3 0 0 – 5 0 . 2
McDonnell Douglas 1 2 1 , 1 9 0 6 3 , 6 1 2 – 5 7 , 5 7 8 – 4 7 . 5
We s t i n g h o u s e 1 1 5 , 7 7 4 7 7 , 8 1 3 – 3 7 , 9 6 1 – 3 2 . 8
X e ro x 1 1 0 , 0 0 0 8 5 , 2 0 0 – 2 4 , 0 0 0 – 2 2 . 5
G o odyear Ti re 1 0 7 , 9 6 1 8 7 , 3 9 0 – 2 0 , 5 7 1 – 1 9 . 1
Sara Lee 1 0 7 , 8 0 0 1 4 9 , 1 0 0 4 1 , 3 0 0 3 8 . 3
Allied Signal 1 0 5 , 8 0 0 8 8 , 5 0 0 – 1 7 , 3 0 0 – 1 6 . 4
M o t o ro l a 1 0 5 , 0 0 0 1 4 2 , 0 0 0 3 7 , 0 0 0 3 5 . 2
E x x o n 1 0 4 , 0 0 0 8 2 , 0 0 0 – 2 2 , 0 0 0 – 2 1 . 2
Rockwell Intern a t i o n a l 1 0 1 , 9 0 0 8 2 , 6 7 1 – 1 9 , 2 2 9 – 1 8 . 9
N o t e : F i g u res are for worldwide employment and downsizing. They are not adjusted for
acquisitions and thus may considerably understate gross downsizing.
aIn 1990 Pepsico was listed as an industrial company under the “beverage” classification; in
1995, after acquiring a substantial number of restaurants, the company was listed as a
service company under the “food services” classification.
S o u rc e : “The Fortune 500 by Industry,” F o rtune, April 22, 1991; “The Fortune 1000
Ranked Within Industries,” Fortune, April 29, 1996.
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and professional employees (U.S. Department of Commerce 1983, 406;
1995, 437; 1996, 430).
From Value Creation to Value Extraction
The first place to look for an explanation of the disappearance of good
jobs in the American economy is employment trends within the nation’s
major industrial corporations. In the decades after World War II, the
foundations of U.S. economic development were the willingness and
ability of the nation’s major industrial corporations to allocate their
considerable financial resources to investment strategies that created the
good jobs that many Americans began to take for granted. In 1969 the
50 largest U.S. industrial corporations by sales directly employed 6.4
million people, equivalent to 7.5 percent of the civilian labor force (see
Table 1). In 1991 these companies directly employed 5.2 million people,
equivalent to 4.2 percent of the labor force, and since 1991 the down-
sizing of these companies has gone forw a rd at a steady, and even
increasing, pace. Yet, prior to the 1980s large industrial corporations had
been the employers that had provided the most stable and remunerative
jobs in the economy.
What underlies the prevalence and persistence of corporate downsizing?
A typical top management explanation is that changes in competition
and technology have rendered a significant portion of existing corporate
labor forces redundant in terms of the quantity of people who can
generate corporate revenues and the quality of skills needed to do so.
F rom this perspective, downsizing is part and parcel of a strategy for
corporate restructuring to enhance the ability of remaining employees to
generate the revenues that can sustain their employment. Should the
corporation try to maintain existing levels of employment, so the argu-
ment goes, the long-term viability of the whole enterprise could be in
jeopardy; the obligation of the corporation is to remain competitive, an
objective that may well be in conflict with maintaining the prior stock
of good jobs.
The realities of international competition and technological change
undoubtedly demand organizational re s t ructuring. It is possible,
h o w e v e r, that top managers of major U.S. corporations have focused
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so much on job cutting as the prime mode of cost cutting that they
have ignored the allocation of corporate re s o u rces to innovative
investment strategies. Although competitive outcomes are always
u n c e rtain when investment decisions are made, innovative investment
strategies can result in products of higher quality and lower cost than
the enterprise had previously been capable of generating. Such invest-
ment strategies invariably re q u i re the allocation of substantial
re s o u rces to skill formation within the enterprise to develop integrated
skill bases. This skill formation builds on capabilities that the enter-
prise has already accumulated and provides the foundation for learn i n g
p rocesses that can enable the enterprise to gain sustained competitive
advantage. At the same time it can form a new foundation for sustain-
able pro s p e r i t y. 
Changes in employment within the major U.S. industrial corporations
appear to be related to changes in the ways in which those who govern
these corporations have been choosing to allocate corporate re v e n u e s .
Corporate managers control substantial financial and prod u c t i v e
resources that permit them to make strategic choices in the allocation of
re s o u rces. Retained earnings—undistributed profits and capital
consumption allowances—have always provided, and continue to
provide, the major share of resources for investment in productive capa-
bilities that can make innovation and industrial development possible.
F rom 1970 to 1989, for example, retained earnings accounted for 91
p e rcent of the net sources of finance for U.S. nonfinancial industrial
corporations, while debt finance accounted for 34 percent and new
equity and other sources were negative (Corbett and Jenkinson 1996, 77;
Hall 1994, 139).
The vast resources of major corporations are allocated through a process
of strategic decision making, and the choices corporate managers make
can have profound effects on the availability and viability of stable and
remunerative employment opportunities. To understand what has been
happening to employment opportunities in the United States, therefore,
we have to understand strategic decision making within the nation’s
major industrial corporations and how and why it has changed over
time. The rhetoric used to support downsizing proclaims that the prime,
if not only, corporate responsibility is to “create value for shareholders.”
And, indeed, since the 1970s many corporations have become obsessed
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with shedding employees for the sake of boosting profits and distributing
revenues to stockholders. 
Under the banner of “creating shareholder value,” these distributions
have taken the forms of both dividends and stock re p u rchases. The
payout ratio—dividends as a proportion of corporate earnings—has risen
from about 45 percent in the 1960s and 1970s to over 60 percent in the
1980s and 1990s. Stock repurchases have risen even more dramatically.
Prior to the 1980s corporations tended to issue more equities than they
repurchased, although equity issues have never been an important source
of funds for investment in productive capabilities. But during the 1980s
the net equity issues for U.S. corporations became negative in many
years, largely as a result of stock repurchases. In 1985, when total corpo-
rate dividends were $92 billion, stock re p u rchases were $20 billion, or
about 22 percent of dividends. In 1989, when dividends had risen to
$128 billion, stock re p u rchases had increased to over $60 billion, or
almost 50 percent of dividends. In 1990 to 1993 annual stock re p u r-
chases averaged about $33 billion, but in 1994 they rose to close to 
$70 billion, or 33 percent of dividends, and during the first nine months
of 1995 they were already over that amount (“Firms Ponder How Best to
Use Their Cash” 1995). 
The managers of the major U.S. industrial corporations were not always
so oriented toward creating value for shareholders. In the quart e r
c e n t u ry after World War II—during which time the trend was toward
greater income equality in the United States—the strategic orientation
of corporations was to allocate corporate revenues to the organization for
both managers’ and workers’ incomes and benefits as well as for invest-
ment in plant, equipment, and skills, especially the skills of managerial
personnel. Why, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, did these corpo-
rations turn from reinvesting revenues and generating growing numbers
of stable and remunerative jobs to distributing revenues to shareholders
and shedding long-time employees? The problem is not just a change in
ideological outlook by the top managers. To understand the transforma-
tion of U.S. industrial corporations from financial commitment to finan-
cial liquidity and from value creation to value extraction re q u i res an
analysis of the institutional and organizational foundations of U.S.
industrial development during the 1950s and 1960s and the erosion of
these foundations since the 1970s. At work in the erosion process are
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industrial competition from abroad and financial transformation 
at home. 
The Promise of Sustainable Prosperity
The United States has always prided itself on being the land of opport u-
nity—a nation in which although any one individual might rise or fall
e c o n o m i c a l l y, for the population as a whole economic prosperity would
be an ever- i n c reasing re a l i t y. The United States emerged from Wo r l d
War II with by far the highest GDP per capita in the world. In the
decades after the war the United States not only held leading positions
in capital goods industries, such as steel, machine tools, and chemicals,
but also was dominant in consumer goods industries, such as automo-
biles, electronics, and pharmaceuticals. In the rapidly expanding global
economy that then prevailed, U.S. leadership in technology and
p roductivity enabled dominant American corporations to offer stable
and remunerative employment to growing numbers of managers and
workers, both within their own enterprises and in their supply and
distribution networks. 
In the mid 1960s the United States had 30 percent or more of world
market share in aircraft and aircraft parts (50 percent in 1965), guided
missiles and aerospace (43 percent), professional and scientific instru-
ments (36 percent), office, computing and accounting machinery (36
p e rcent), and engines, turbines, and engine parts (31 percent) (Diwan
and Chakraborty 1991, 43). In 1965 the number of scientists and engi-
neers engaged in R&D as a pro p o rtion of total employment was 2 1/2 to
3 times higher in the United States than in Japan, Germ a n y, or France
(Nelson and Wright 1994, 151). Into the late 1960s, in absolute term s ,
e x p e n d i t u re on R&D in the United States was more than double that
in the United Kingdom, Germ a n y, France, and Japan combined, larg e l y
because of massive U.S. federal government funds deployed in combina-
tion with investment and employment by U.S. industrial corporations
(Nelson and Wright 1994, 150; Mowery and Rosenberg 1993). The
United States also had a 26 percent share of world machine tool
p roduction, larger even than that of Germ a n y, which had by far the
l a rgest share of world export s .
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In the decades after World War II the advantageous position of U.S.
i n d u s t ry in the global economy created the promise of sustainable pro s-
perity for Americans. A more limited promise of sustainable pro s p e r i t y
had also appeared in the 1920s when, particularly in the consumer
durable, chemical, and electrical manufacturing industries, a number of
corporations consolidated their control over large market share s .
Between 1919 and 1929 manufacturing production in the United
States grew at a rate of 8.0 percent per annum and labor prod u c t i v i t y
in manufacturing at a rate of 5.6 percent per annum. In sharing in this
g rowth, managers and stockholders fared much better than workers.
Between 1920 and 1929 managerial salaries in manufacturing rose by
22 percent and enterprise surpluses rose by 63 percent, while the wages
of workers in manufacturing fell by 6 percent (Bell 1940, 28). 
The workers who fared best during the 1920s were those who found
employment with the dominant mass producers. In the early 1930s,
however, the promise of sustainable prosperity vanished. The deepening
d e p ression of economic activity put an end to the stable employment
that the dominant corporations had been able and willing to provide in
the 1920s. Shop-floor workers were particularly affected by these massive
cutbacks. Having invested in the skills of managerial employees, the
corporations sought to keep their managerial organizations intact. The
m o re valuable the employees as productive assets, the more re l u c t a n t
corporations were to part with them. Indeed, the industrial corporations
continued to augment their R&D capabilities during the 1930s. The
research laboratories of U.S. manufacturing enterprises employed 2,775
scientific and engineering personnel, or 0.56 re s e a rch professionals per
thousand manufacturing employees, in 1921; 10,927 professionals, or
1.93 per thousand, in 1933; and almost 28,000 professionals, or 3.5 per
thousand, in 1940 (Mowery 1986; Chandler 1985). 
During the early 1930s most of the industrial corporations—even
those that had pursued pro g ressive employment policies in the
1920s—deemed shop-floor workers to be dispensable because the
companies had not invested in their skills. From the nineteenth
c e n t u ry the prevailing managerial ideology in the United States had
been to develop technology in ways that could dispense with the
need for shop-floor skills in the utilization of technology (Lazonick
1990). The pro g ressive employment practices of the 1920s were
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designed to secure the cooperation of shop-floor workers to ensure
high levels of utilization of expensive high-throughput technologies.
But at the same time corporate managers sought to develop new tech-
nologies that could take the exercise of skills off the shop floor. 
When, during the 1930s, even the most dominant industrial corpora-
tions failed to provide shop-floor workers with stable and re m u n e r a-
tive jobs, these employees turned to industrial unionism to pro v i d e
them with some control over their future. Backed by New Deal legis-
lation that protected the rights of workers to organize unions and
engage in collective bargaining, shop-floor employees in American
manufacturing built powerful mass-production unions that would
become a major force in ensuring employment security and high wages
for them in the post-World War II expansion. In the postwar decades
these unions did not challenge the principle of management’s right to
c o n t rol the development and utilization of the enterprise’s prod u c t i v e
capabilities (Lazonick 1990). However, the quid pro quo for union
cooperation was that seniority was to be a prime criterion for pro m o-
tion in a well-defined job stru c t u re, thus giving long-time workers
access to a succession of jobs paying gradually rising hourly wage rates.
This labor-management accord provided the organizational basis on
which the dominant industrial corporations shared the gains of the
postwar prosperity with shop-floor workers.
The economic basis for the growth of secure and well-paid employ-
ment opportunities and a more equal distribution of income in the
United States in the postwar decades was the rapid growth of the
i n t e rnational economy combined with the capability of the major
U.S. industrial corporations to dominate in global competition. The
basis of the sustained competitive advantage of these corporations was
o rganizational learning, that is, collective and cumulative learn i n g
that enables an enterprise to develop and utilize products and pro c e s s
technologies that competitors cannot easily replicate. In most of the
U.S. industrial corporations that dominated in global competition,
this organizational learning occurred among technical, administra-
tive, and professional personnel within the managerial level of the
o rganizational stru c t u re and specifically excluded operatives on the
shop floor.
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These corporations still relied on the cooperation of shop-floor
employees to secure high degrees of utilization of the process technolo-
gies in which the corporations had invested. Therefore, the corporations
could benefit economically, within the framework of the industrial
unionism, by sharing some of the returns from their sustained competi-
tive advantage with shop-floor workers in the form of stable employment
and good wages and benefits.
The corporations may have provided shop-floor workers with stable and
remunerative employment, but they made little, if any, attempt to inte-
grate them into the organizational learning processes. The ideology
persisted that these workers were merely “hourly employees” and hence
easily interchangeable and replaceable units of labor. Such hourly
employees stood in contrast to professional, administrative, and tech-
nical employees (the salaried personnel), who were deemed to be
members of the enterprise in whose skills the corporation had to invest
and whose capabilities the corporation had to retain. The result was a
sharp organizational segmentation between managers and workers—
between insiders and outsiders to the learning process—that would
prove to be the Achilles’ heel of American industrial corporations when
challenged from abroad by corporations that integrated shop-floor labor
into the processes of organizational learning.
The Challenge to Sustainable Prosperity
The sustained competitive advantage of an enterprise, region, or nation
depends on its ability to develop and utilize productive resources better
than rival enterprises, regions, or nations. Superior development and
utilization of productive re s o u rces have increasingly re q u i red learn i n g
that is collective and cumulative rather than simply the aggregation of
l e a rning by individuals (O’Sullivan 1996; Lazonick and O’Sullivan
1996). The skill bases that can be integrated to generate such organiza-
tional learning vary across industries because diff e rent technologies
p rovide diff e rent opportunities for collective learning. For example,
o rganizational learning in the pharmaceuticals industry relies on the
integration of a very different skill base from the skill base in the auto-
mobile industry. Moreover, even within a particular industry, the char-
acter of the integrated skill base that can generate org a n i z a t i o n a l
PPB No.37  2/18/99  2:08 PM  Page 19learning varies over time as cumulative learning transforms the possibili-
ties for a collective skill base to develop and utilize productive resources.
For example, compared with the skill bases restricted to managerial
personnel that enabled U.S. automobile companies to be the dominant
mass producers from the 1920s to the 1960s, the skill bases that enabled
Japanese automobile producers to challenge U.S. companies successfully
a re broader and deeper. They include both managerial and shop-floor
employees within core enterprises and integration of the skill bases in
core enterprises with those in suppliers. 
As a general rule, within any given industry and for any given tech-
nology, the potential for organizational learning has become increasingly
dependent on the integration of broader and deeper skill bases. These
broader and deeper skill bases, mobilized for industrial development, in
turn can provide the foundation for the sustainable prosperity of a region
or nation. Not only can they generate the higher- q u a l i t y, lower- c o s t
products that bring economic growth, but, by relying on the participa-
tion of more people with greater skills to generate these products, they
can distribute the gains of economic growth more widely among the
working population.
If the challenges to sustainable prosperity in the United States have
come from foreign enterprises that develop and utilize prod u c t i v e
re s o u rces by integrating broader and deeper skill bases, strategic
responses of U.S. enterprises could entail organizational integration that
extends the collective learning process to groups—employees and other
firms—whose productive capabilities were previously excluded from that
process. But such innovative responses may not be forthcoming because
corporate decision makers may have neither the incentive nor the ability
to make such strategic investments. They may seek to compete on the
basis of the narrower skill bases that had given their enterprises advan-
tage in the past. In the face of competitive challenges, they may even
choose not to innovate, that is, not to develop and utilize part i c u l a r
technologies in industries in which a competitive response demands
investments in broader and deeper skill bases.
In the process of innovation a necessary complement to organizational
integration is financial commitment, that is, the social relations that 
a re the basis for the ongoing access of a business organization to the
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financial resources required to sustain the development and utilization of
productive resources (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 1997a, 1997b). The level
and duration of financial commitment required to generate innovation
varies across industries with different learning processes and over time as
learning processes require broader and deeper skill bases. 
In combination, organizational integration and financial commitment
provide social foundations for innovative business enterprise. In terms of
inputs into the production process, organizational integration supplies
knowledge and financial commitment supplies money. However, these
inputs are not commodities. They reflect social conditions or institu-
tions—the relations to the business organization of people who supply
knowledge and money. These social institutions determine the norm s
a c c o rding to which strategic decisions are made within enterprises
concerning the allocation of resources to production and the allocation
of returns from it. Without institutions that support organizational inte-
gration and financial commitment, business enterprises cannot generate
innovation. In all of the advanced industrial nations, in different ways
and to varying degrees at any one time as well as over time, org a n i z a-
tional integration and financial commitment provide the social founda-
tions for innovation and industrial development. 
O rganizational Segmentation—Hierarchical, 
Functional, and Strategic
The challenge to high value-added industry in the United States has
come from enterprises that have gained competitive advantage not by
paying lower wages than American companies pay, but by developing
and utilizing broader and deeper skill bases than American companies
do. Even within product markets in which U.S. companies remain world
leaders, there is insufficient broadening and deepening of the skill base
to retain competitive advantage for producers in the United States.
As we have indicated, the history of the American employment system has
c reated profound biases within American corporations toward hierarc h i c a l
segmentation and against investment in broader and deeper skill bases.
F rom the early nineteenth century the mobility of labor in the United
States created a bias toward developing manufacturing technologies 
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(Lazonick 1990). To develop such technologies and ensure their complete
utilization re q u i red investment in managerial organization. Attempts by
skilled workers in the late nineteenth century to increase the power of craft
unions through their organization into the American Federation of Labor
only increased the resolve of entre p reneurs and managers to develop and
utilize manufacturing technologies in ways that excluded shop-floor
workers from the learning process. The industrial unionism that re p l a c e d
craft unionism during the 1930s helped to institutionalize the hierarc h i c a l
segmentation. Industrial unions focused on getting their members a share of
the competitive gains made possible by learning processes at the managerial
level. In re t u rn for higher wages and benefits, shop-floor workers cooper-
ated in supplying the labor eff o rt that ensured high levels of utilization of
expensive process technologies. 
The problems of collective learning in U.S. industrial corporations go
beyond the hierarchical segmentation of management and labor. Within
the managerial structure itself, the learning process has become increas-
ingly subject to functional segmentation. Managerial personnel in
marketing, product design, and manufacturing do not engage in “concur-
rent engineering,” working as a team. Instead, upstream specialists (for
example, design engineers) work in isolation from downstream special-
ists (for example, production engineers), in effect, throwing their work—
and the problems inherent in it—over a wall to the next functional
activity compartment. Functional segmentation results in longer product
development cycles and inferior products than can be achieved with
functional integration (Hartley 1990; Funk 1992; Clark and Fujimoto
1991). Functional segmentation in U.S. industry has been exacerbated
by the desire of specialized professional, administrative, and technical
employees to protect their positions within business enterprises fro m
challenges to their authority and responsibility from top managers above
and shop-floor workers below.
In addition to hierarchical and functional segmentation, there has been a
tendency in U.S. industrial corporations toward strategic segmentation—
the vesting of strategic decision making power in high-level managers
and their isolation at the top of the corporate hierarc h y. In the face of a
g rowing hierarchical and functional segmentation of postwar corporate
o rganizations, top managers portrayed themselves as generalists who
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specialized knowledge about particular products and processes was often
p o rtrayed as an impediment to strategic decision making, and there was a
tendency for people with financial rather than production expertise to
rise to the top positions (Hayes and Abernathy 1980).
Strategic segmentation meant that the decision makers came to have
little capacity for understanding and evaluating the problems and possi-
bilities for organizational learning within the enterprise. The separation
of these top managers from the organizational learning process resulted in
strategic decision making that was limited in its ability to assess or build
on the enterprise’s innovative capabilities (O’Sullivan 1996). Strategic
managers often made costly investments in plant and equipment without
c o m p l e m e n t a ry investments in the organizational learning that could
combine physical and human re s o u rces to create competitive advantage.
2 
F rom Financial Commitment to Financial Liquidity
Organizational integration and the collective learning process for which
it provides a foundation re q u i re financial commitment. Investment in
organizational integration does not occur automatically; it is the result of
strategic decisions by those who control financial resources that can be
allocated to such investment. The ability of strategic managers to allo-
cate resources to the collective learning process depends on the degree
to which they themselves are integrated into that process. Their incen-
tive to make such allocations depends on the extent to which they see
their own goals as being furt h e red through investment in a learn i n g
process that is both collective and cumulative. 
In the presence of strategic segmentation top managers will be more
susceptible to pre s s u res from financial interests to make corporate
re s o u rces a source of financial liquidity rather than financial commit-
ment. Strategic managers who are not integrated into the collective
learning process are more likely to take actions—such as issuing higher
dividends, repurchasing stock, and reducing employment—to boost the
re t u rns on corporate stock in the short run instead of allocating
re s o u rces to the investments in organization and technology that are
necessary to achieve sustainable prosperity over the long run. 
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p rocess within their corporations, segmented strategic managers will align
their interests with public stockholders, whose only involvement with the
corporation is the security purchase they made on the public market and
whose only interest in the corporation is financial. Such managers eval-
uate corporate perf o rmance from the perspective of financial liquidity
rather than financial commitment. They contend that the prime, if not
sole, goal of the corporation is to create value for shareholders. For their
success in maximizing shareholder wealth, they receive ample, even exor-
bitant, personal re w a rds, even as most other corporate employees experi-
ence lower earnings and less employment stability and security.
This alignment of strategic managers with public stockholders at the
expense of investment in organizational learning is precisely what
happened in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. Encouraging
these changes in business investment strategy was a transformation in
the way wealth-holding American households saved for the future .
F rom the 1960s to the 1980s fundamental changes in U.S. financial
institutions encouraged American households to use re t u rns fro m
investments in publicly traded common stocks as the prime means by
which they saved. In doing so, they inadvertently exacerbated the
p roblem of long-term business investment in the United States by
encouraging not only financial liquidity but also the strategic segmenta-
tion of top corporate managers.
At a time when technological challenges and international competition
w e re beginning to demand investment in broader and deeper skill bases,
the dynamic interaction of organizational segmentation and financial
liquidity led many U.S. industrial corporations to flee from such invest-
ment. Insofar as these corporations have invested in org a n i z a t i o n a l
l e a rning, they have done so through the development and utilization of
n a rrower and more concentrated skill bases, thus limiting the range of
p roductive activities and technologies in which U.S. companies can
compete. This combination of organizational segmentation and financial
liquidity is a prime cause of the erosion of sustainable prosperity in the
United States in the 1980s and 1990s.
At the center of the shift from financial commitment to financial
liquidity is the transformation of the role of the stock market in business
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conventional understanding of the role of the stock market in the 
development of the American economy is based more on fiction than
reality. The fiction is that business enterprises rely on the stock market
to fund long-term investment and therefore an increased flow of house-
hold saving into the stock market is favorable to long-term economic
growth. The reality is that in the United States the stock market is not,
and never has been, an important source of funds for long-term business
investment. The reality is that the use of publicly traded shares as a
means of household saving entails living off the past rather than
investing for the future.
T h roughout the twentieth century corporate retentions and debt, not
equity issues, have been the main sources of funds for business invest-
ment. The lack of control public stockholders have retained over earn-
ings of industrial corporations was not imposed on them by corporate
managers or government regulators, as some have contended (Roe
1994). Rather it was a feature of public stockholding that port f o l i o
investors not just accepted but favored. 
The existence of a highly liquid stock market facilitated the growth of
the U.S. industrial corporation. It did so, however, not because house-
holds as public stockholders provided companies with new sources of
funds, but because it gave strategic managers control over financial
re s o u rces internal to the enterprise that could be used for purposes of
market expansion, vertical integration, and product diversification.
When the growth of the enterprise was internal, retained earn i n g s ,
leveraged if necessary with bonds, provided the financial re s o u rces for
g rowth. When the growth of the enterprise was external (that is,
through merger and acquisition), the replacement of the acquired firm’s
equity with the stock of the acquiring corporation provided the financial
resources for growth.
A particular form of corporate growth that emerged full-blown in the
1960s was conglomeration. By relying on the prevailing business
ideology that a well-trained general manager could manage anything,
the conglomeration movement glorified strategic segmentation. In
acquiring companies and consolidating financial decision making in the
head office, the conglomerate stripped control from those who had been
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often retained former top managers as divisional heads, but failure to
meet financial perf o rmance targets could lead to their replacement by
head office personnel who, like the head office in general, had no idea of
the processes of organizational learning or the strategies to shape them
that the divisional businesses required to succeed.
3
For Wall Street, as well as for many corporate managers, the conglomer-
ation movement transformed the decision to merge with or acquire a
business activity from a decision about investment in prod u c t i v e
resources to one about investment in financial assets. The financial busi-
ness of merger and acquisition entailed not only putting industrial enter-
prises together but also pulling them apart. From the perspective of
p roductive perf o rmance, the divestitures that followed conglomeration
had the potential for rectifying the problems of strategic segmentation
that the conglomeration movement had exacerbated. But the movement
also laid the foundation for the rise of a new financial market—the high-
yield, or junk, bond market—that during the 1970s created both the
incentive and ability for Wall Street to treat productive enterprises like
financial assets. Far more than even the debt-financed conglomeration
of the late 1960s, the use of junk bonds for buyouts and takeovers forced
financial liquidity on U.S. industrial corporations.
Strategic managers need to have discretion if investments are to be made
that generate returns and result in sustained competitive advantage for
their enterprises and sustainable prosperity for the economy. Their
investment decisions have a profound impact on whether their company
invests for the future or lives off the past. The real problem for innova-
tion and industrial development is not that strategic managers have
d i s c retion, but that they have become too isolated from the org a n i z a-
tional learning necessary to develop and utilize productive re s o u rc e s .
The market for corporate control does not demand an integration of
strategy and learning. The use of stock-based rewards aligns the interests
of top managers with stockholders, thus encouraging strategic segmenta-
tion, making it all the more certain that the integration of strategy and
learning will not occur.
4
If the goal is to encourage innovative enterprise, such segmented
managers should not be in positions of strategic control over enterprise
Investment in Innovation
Public Policy Brief 26
PPB No.37  2/18/99  2:08 PM  Page 26resources. But the proponents of the market for corporate control accept
strategic segmentation as long as the managers create value for share-
holders by extracting re s o u rces from the corporation. Only by ignoring
the process of innovation and its need for organizational integration
and financial commitment can the proponents of the market for 
corporate control argue that the good manager is one who ensure s
financial liquidity.
Why do the American people seem to favor financial liquidity over
financial commitment? In part the answer is ideology. Even those
Americans who are losing out by the erosion of sustainable pro s p e r i t y
believe that the governance of private enterprise is none of their busi-
ness. But ideology is not the whole answer. The fact is that a gre a t
many Americans—including the 45 percent who have pension
coverage (Ghilarducci 1992, 3) and even many employees whose jobs
a re becoming more insecure — a re sharing in a process that cre a t e s
value for shareholders, even if it does not create sustainable pro s p e r i t y
for society as a whole. They share in the process of extracting value
f rom the economy through a system of household finance that has
come to rely increasingly on the prices and yields of corporate stock.
By relying increasingly on the stock market to augment their income
and saving, these relatively privileged Americans have developed a
major stake in maintaining high re t u rns on corporate stock.
Unlike the days when stockholding in any one company was frag-
mented among hundreds of thousands of household investors, over the
past three decades institutional investors have become incre a s i n g l y
central to the American saving system; with ever- i n c reasing holdings
of stocks, they constitute the backbone of the market for corporate
c o n t rol. Households held 90 percent of all corporate equity in 1952 but
only 48 percent in 1994. Pension funds, on the other hand, incre a s e d
their share of corporate stock held by 25 percent from 1952 to 1994
and mutual funds increased their share by 10 percent. In 1996 and
1997 massive amounts of household saving flowed into mutual funds to
reap the re t u rns of the stock market. 
Using the collective power of institutional investing, households have
been able to extract higher yields out of the corporate economy. The
s e a rch for higher yields is the raison d’être of U.S. institutional
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investors. As we have seen, business enterprises have never relied to
any significant extent on public stockholders to invest in the develop-
ment and utilization of productive re s o u rces. Despite the “ownership”
rights attached to stockholding, since the beginning of the twentieth
c e n t u ry, when the market in industrial securities emerged, public stock-
holders have bought equities precisely because, in the presence of liquid
stock markets, they do not have to commit their time, energ y, or, with
limited liability, additional money to the business enterprise in which
they hold a security. In liquid stock markets public stockholders follow
the Wall Street rule: If they do not like the re t u rns on a stock, they
should not try to exercise ownership rights to boost the re t u rns, but
should simply call their broker or click the mouse on their computer
and be rid of their ownership stake (Lowenstein 1988, 91–93). 
What the shift of stockholding to institutional investors has done for
American households is to give them an alternative to the Wall Street
rule through the collective power of institutional investing. During the
1960s the mutual funds, which had about 85 percent of their assets in
stocks, increased their control over outstanding shares to more than 4
p e rcent and played an important arbitrage role in the conglomeration
movement by buying up large blocks of stocks that were rumored to be
in play and selling them to the corporate raiders at higher prices (Editors
of F o rt u n e 1970, 142). In 1975 the institutional investors, now faced
with inflation and low securities yields, pre s s u red Wall Street to end
fixed commissions on trading, setting the stage for a major increase in
the volume of trading through the churning of investment port f o l i o s
(Vietor 1987). The participation of a network of institutional investors
made it possible for Michael Milken to create the junk-bond market in
the 1970s and to use it to launch hostile takeovers in the 1980s.
By the mid 1980s institutional investors could have a direct effect on
corporations. American households could now put pre s s u re on compa-
nies to get their stock prices up, and, as we have seen, the top managers
of American companies were increasingly open to these demands. In the
a f t e rmath of the October 1987 stock market crash, major institutional
investors, led by California State Public Employees Retirement System
and its head, John Hanson, began to engage in “relational investing” to
get companies to take actions that would increase the value of their
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stockholdings (Blair 1995, chap. 5). As a result, the S&P index declined
only 7 percent in 1988 and bounced back well over 21 percent in 1989. 
Restoring Sustainable Pro s p e r i t y
In the late 1990s sustainable prosperity in the United States re q u i res that
U.S. industrial corporations invest in broader and deeper skill bases than
those in which they have invested historically. Investment in such skill
bases can generate the higher- q u a l i t y, lower-cost products that can give
U.S. industrial enterprises sustained advantage in international competi-
tion. Such investments re q u i re strategic decision making by corporate
managers who have the ability and incentive to allocate financial
re s o u rces to learning processes that are collective and cumulative. Their
ability and incentive to make such allocations derive from their integra-
tion into the processes of organizational learning and their control of
committed finance. 
H o w e v e r, over the past few decades organizational segmentation and finan-
cial liquidity—manifested by higher payout ratios and massive stock re p u r-
chases—have come to characterize the U.S. industrial corporation. To
re f o rm the system of corporate governance to achieve sustainable pro s p e r i t y,
one must compare the prevailing locus and exercise of strategic control with
that which should be put in place. The debate over corporate govern a n c e
and economic perf o rmance centers on three questions (O’Sullivan 1996,
f o rthcoming): (1) Who should control strategic investment decisions in the
corporation? (2) What types of investments should they make? (3) How
should the re t u rns on these investments be distributed?
Stockholder Contro l
Thus far in the United States the debate over corporate governance has
been dominated by proponents of stockholder control.
5 They view stock-
holders as the “principals” in whose interest the corporation should be
run. They recognize that stockholders must rely on managers to perform
c e rtain functions in the actual running of the corporation, but believe
that managers should function as the agents of the stockholders in 
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g o v e rnance is to ensure that the actions of managers as agents are
aligned with the interests of stockholders as principals.
P roponents of stockholder control have argued, often with justification,
that strategic managers of industrial corporations are ill-informed and
s e l f - s e rving in their allocation of corporate re s o u rces and re t u rns and
t h e re f o re do not create adequate value for stockholders. To increase the
re t u rns to stockholders, these proponents advocate, first, re a l i g n i n g
managerial incentives through the use of stock-based re w a rds; second,
using the market for corporate control to enable stockholders to take over
companies and replace managers who misallocate corporate re s o u rc e s ;
and, third, distributing more re t u rns to stockholders so that they can
d i rectly reallocate re s o u rces in ways that “maximize shareholder value.”
But why are stockholders the principals in whose interests the corporation
should be run? Proponents of stockholder control assert that, as equity
investors, stockholders are the only participants in the corporation who
make investments in the corporation without any contractual guarantee of
a re t u rn. The corporation has a contractual obligation to pay fixed-income
claimants a specified remuneration (the market price of their factor input)
i rrespective of the perf o rmance of the enterprise as a whole. Insofar as
stockholders secure a re t u rn on their investments, it is as re s i d u a l
claimants, and hence they alone have an interest in the size of the corpo-
r a t i o n ’s profit or loss; they have an interest in allocating corporate
re s o u rces to their best alternative uses to make the residual as large as
possible. The maximization of shareholder value will result in superior
economic perf o rmance for not only the particular corporation but also the
economy as a whole.
In response to the three corporate governance questions, proponents of
stockholder control would reply that to achieve superior economic
p e rf o rmance, (1) stockholders should have strategic control (2) that
p e rmits them (directly or through their managers acting as agents) to
allocate their corporate re s o u rces to those existing alternative invest-
ment opportunities that offer the highest expected rates of re t u rn and
(3) that enables them to determine the proportion of corporate returns
that should be reinvested in the corporation and the pro p o rtion that
should be distributed to them for reallocation elsewhere in the economy. 
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of private pro p e rty rights and market relations to the corporate economy.
Yet, since the 1920s, if not before, the very existence of the corporation
as a central and enduring entity in the U.S. economy has prompted a
number of American economists to question the relevance of these
beliefs (Veblen 1923; Berle and Means 1932; Schumpeter 1942;
Galbraith 1967; Lazonick 1991). And they should, for the realities of
successful industrial development in the United States and abroad during
this century flatly contradict the basic assumptions of the stockholder
perspective. Let us consider the problems with the perspective in terms of
each of the three critical corporate governance questions. 
Who should control strategic investment decisions in the corporation?
Stockholders have not exercised strategic control in the U.S. industrial
corporation during this century. The evolution of the corporate form in
the United States entailed the separation of stock ownership fro m
strategic control, and it was in the presence of that separation that U.S.
industrial corporations made the investments in organization and tech-
nology that, by the middle decades of this century, enabled the United
States to dominate the world economy.
P roponents of stockholder control argue that managers have acquired too
much independent power over the allocation of corporate re s o u rces and
re t u rns, but do not explain how and why corporate managers, as so-called
agents, who presumably could be hired, re w a rded, and fired by stock-
holders, acquired such power. We have shown that, historically, U.S.
corporate managers acquired power because they were the strategic deci-
sion makers who allocated corporate re s o u rces to organizational learn i n g
p rocesses that enabled these corporations to be innovative and attain
sustained advantage in the industries in which they competed. In general,
the separation of stock ownership from strategic control was a pre c o n d i-
tion for placing such decision-making power in the hands of managers
who were integrated into the collective and cumulative learn i n g
p rocesses that made their enterprises innovative.
Indeed, even in the initial public offerings that separated stock owner-
ship from strategic control, the investments in securities that public
stockholders made were not used to finance investments in new
p roductive capabilities, but to transfer ownership rights to re v e n u e s
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a l ready been put in place. Hence, even with the rise of the publicly
held corporation at the turn of the century, the new public stock-
holders never assumed the function of strategic decision making in
U.S. industrial corporations. 
On the contrary, American households and some financial institutions
w e re enticed to hold stock because of the demonstrated re v e n u e -
generating capabilities of the going concerns for which the stock was
issued. As the revenue-generating capabilities of these industrial corpo-
rations were sustained over the first three decades of this century, a
highly liquid market in industrial stocks emerged, thus making stock-
holders all the more willing to make financial investments in corporate
stock without having any knowledge of, or interest in, the strategic
decision making processes that were determining corporate investments
in productive re s o u rces. That is, the investment decisions of public
stockholders have always been based on financial considerations, not
p roductive considerations.
To recognize that the corporate managers who occupy positions of
strategic decision making have become ill-suited to allocate re s o u rc e s
to innovative investment strategies in no way implies that stock-
holders have either the incentive or ability to perf o rm that function.
Rather the problem for corporate governance is to understand why 
the current corporate managers have lost the necessary incentive 
and ability.
What types of investments should they make? P roponents of stockholder
c o n t rol argue that stockholders allocate their financial re s o u rces to those
a l t e rnative investment opportunities that offer the highest expected
rates of re t u rn. In doing so, the proponents assume that stockholders
take the alternatives as given. There is no expectation that stockholders
a re engaged in making innovative investments that create new opport u-
nities for generating re t u rns, either directly in selecting their investment
p o rtfolios or indirectly through the activities of managers who are
supposed to serve as their agents. Such a constrained view of the corpo-
rate investment process is not problematic for the proponents of stock-
holder control because, like the neoclassical theory of the market
economy in which they root their arguments, the stockholder 
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in determining the perf o rmance of the industrial enterprise and the
economy in which it operates.
6
How far the stockholder perspective is from recognizing the centrality 
of innovative investment to the performance of the economy is demon-
strated in a recent address to the American Finance Association by 
the perspective’s foremost proponent, Michael Jensen. In his addre s s ,
entitled “The Mod e rn Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of
I n t e rnal Control Systems,” Jensen highlights Joseph Schumpeter’s
concept of creative destruction as a seminal insight into the importance
of “efficient exit” from an industry (Jensen 1993; see also O’Sullivan
1997). Yet, of all the economists of the twentieth century, Schumpeter
demonstrated the centrality of innovative investments to the process of
economic development. When, in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,
(Schumpeter 1942), he argued (in a famous passage that Jensen quotes)
“the problem that is usually being visualized [by the economist] is how
capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant problem
is how it creates and destroys them,” his concern was with the role of
corporate enterprises in the innovation process, not with how (as Jensen
would, quite incredibly, have his followers believe) corporate managers
withdraw re s o u rces from the corporate enterprise.
7 Schumpeter would
have included “efficient exit” as a way in which “capitalism administers
existing structures.” In fact, public stockholders have nothing to do with
the strategic allocation of resources to innovation, so it is not surprising
that the proponents of stockholder control have nothing to say about
S c h u m p e t e r’s “relevant problem”: how, through innovation, the
economy engages in “creative destruction.”
How should the re t u rns on these investments be distributed? Indeed, in his
subsequent writings, Schumpeter went on to stress the critical distinc-
tion between innovation that generates economic development and
adaptation that simply takes existing investment opportunities as given
(Schumpeter 1947). With its focus on extracting resources from corpora-
tions through efficient exit—of which “disgorging the free cash flow” (as
Jensen has so evocatively put it) is the mechanism that part i c u l a r l y
enhances stockholder control—the stockholder perspective is concerned
only with adaptation. The perspective has no conception of, let alone a
theory of, innovation.
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holders so that they can reallocate them to their best alternative uses.
The economic rationale for the distribution of returns to stockholders, as
we have seen, is that they have placed their assets at risk in the enter-
prise on the understanding that they can lay claim to the residual—what
we shall call “the gains of innovation”—that the enterprise generates.
Deny the residual to stockholders, so proponents of stockholder control
argue, and finance for industrial investment will disappear.
But the notion that public stockholders invest in productive assets has
no basis in the history of successful industrial development in the United
States. Public stockholders have never, as a general rule, put their finan-
cial assets at risk by investing in the productive assets of the industrial
enterprise. Rather they have invested their money in the securities
issued by successful enterprises on the basis of investments in productive
assets that have already been made. They have been willing to place
their money in these securities, not because they are claimants to the
gains from innovative enterprise but because of the liquidity of these
securities on financial markets.
By the same token, in the decades prior to the 1970s, when U.S. industrial
corporations were most successful in international competition, the divi-
dend policy of industrial corporations was to maintain the money level of
dividends but not to share the gains of innovation with stockholders
(Lintner 1956). Successful enterprises tended to use the gains of innova-
tion for reinvestment in productive assets, including human re s o u rces, and
to increase the earnings of employees. More o v e r, industrial enterprises
r a rely sought to boost stock prices by re p u rchasing stock. Yet during this
p e r i od there was no shortage of capital for investment in prod u c t i v e
re s o u rces, either in going concerns or new ventures. Since the 1980s,
h o w e v e r, as we have seen, through the transformation of Wall Stre e t
combined with the financial power of institutional investors, stockholders
have been able to lay claim to a larger share of the re t u rns of U.S. indus-
trial enterprises, even as these enterprises have lost market share in the
p roduct markets in which they have competed intern a t i o n a l l y. 
The stockholder perspective has nothing to say about the rise of the
United States to a position of international industrial leadership during
the first six or seven decades of the twentieth century. If it has anything
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decades, it is about how the enhanced power of stockholders to lay claim
to corporate returns has exploited the vulnerability and contributed to
the relative decline of American industrial enterprises in intern a t i o n a l
competition. The stockholder perspective provides a rationale for
Americans who hold corporate stock to live off the accumulations of the
past; it does not provide a framework for understanding how the reform
of corporate governance can help reestablish the social conditions for
innovative enterprise and sustainable prosperity in the future. It is about
destruction, not creation.
Managerial Contro l
One alternative to stockholder control that has been put forth recently
focuses on managerial control.
8 The managerial perspective differs signif-
icantly from the stockholder perspective in its answers to the thre e
corporate governance questions, but it still falls short of providing an
adequate framework for re f o rming corporate governance to generate
sustainable prosperity.
Who should control strategic investment decisions in the corporation?
Unlike proponents of stockholder control, proponents of managerial
c o n t rol recognize that the competitive success of the industrial corpo-
ration and the economy depends on investments in innovation that
entail specialized in-house knowledge and that re q u i re time, and hence
financial commitment, to achieve their developmental potential. The
i m p o rtance of investments in innovation creates a central role for
corporate managers in determining the allocation of corporate
re s o u rces and re t u rns. 
The fundamental diff e rence between stockholder control and managerial
c o n t rol is captured in two quotes that appeared in a Business Week re p o rt
on Kirk Kerkorian’s takeover attempt of Chrysler in 1995. Michael
Jensen, expressing the stockholder perspective, said, “What is the purpose
of [Chry s l e r’s] cash? It’s to allow them [Chry s l e r’s managers] to stay fat and
l a z y.” Michael Port e r, for managerial control, asked, “Who’s going to
make the investments if the presumption is that any management team
will waste re s o u rces?” (“An Old Fashioned Feeding Frenzy” 1995). 
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f rom business academics and management consultants on such matters
as “competitive strategy” and “core competence,” current managers
should be allowed to allocate corporate re s o u rces. Proponents of
managerial control provide no response to arguments that the curre n t
top managers have grown “fat and lazy” or that they have lost the incen-
tive to invest for the future. Besides appropriate advice, all curre n t
managers need is “patient capital” that will enable them to see their
investments in productive resources through to competitive success. 
What types of investments should they make? P roponents of managerial contro l
f requently use such terms as “capabilities,” “knowledge,” “skills,” “learn i n g , ”
“factor creation,” and “innovation” as sources of “sustained competitive
advantage” for the enterprise. This orientation alone sets them apart fro m
the stockholder perspective and brings them into much closer contact with
the real world of industrial development. In expressing a need for patient
capital, more o v e r, they recognize (however implicitly) that the value-
c reating capabilities of productive assets, including human assets, result fro m
a developmental process in which the enterprise must invest.
But, focused as the managerial perspective is on what existing managers
think and do rather than on how they are integrated into the prod u c t i v e
o rganizations in which they invest, it provides no analysis of the social
foundations of innovation and industrial development. The managerial
perspective sees the mind set of strategic managers as determining whether
or not an enterprise invests in innovation. It does not see strategic
managers as actors in a social environment that includes organizations and
institutions; it does not address what determines the mind set of managers. 
In part i c u l a r, little, if any, attention is paid to the relation of strategic
managers to the organization that they are supposed to be managing.
For example, in his influential management book Competitive Strategy,
Michael Porter (1980) devoted only 7 out of some 400 pages to what he
calls organization, and these pages are bereft of any discussion that
p e rtains to the social interaction of people within or across business
enterprises. In a subsequent, and similarly influential, book, C o m p e t i t i v e
A d v a n t a g e, Porter (1985) included a chapter entitled “Achieving
I n t e rrelationships,” but he confined the discussion to strategic re l a t i o n-
ships between business unit managers and even then felt compelled to
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an unexpected chapter on organization” (384). The reason that Port e r
gave is that “organizational impediments” can sometimes get in the way
of good strategy and there f o re warrant study.
9
How should the re t u rns on these investments be distributed? While the
managerial perspective ignores the relation of strategic managers to
other participants in the process of industrial innovation, it focuses on
their relation to the firm ’s stockholders. Like the stockholder perspec-
tive, the managerial perspective views strategic managers as agents of
stockholders, but it recognizes the need for strategic managers to make
developmental investments if the enterprise is to achieve sustained
competitive advantage. The perspective argues, therefore, for managerial
autonomy in setting and implementing investment strategy and looks to
large stockholders, such as wealthy individuals and pension funds, to be
patient capitalists, that is, to provide managers with the control over
financial resources that innovative investment strategies require. Hence
the proponents of managerial control profoundly disagree with the
stockholder control penchant for “disgorging the free cash flow,” mainly
because they understand the importance of innovative investment
strategies, what we have called financial commitment. 
In looking to public stockholders to provide financial commitment,
h o w e v e r, the proponents of managerial control are looking to a group of
people who have never had the ability or incentive to support innova-
tive investment strategies. Public stockholders are, and have always
been, financial investors, not industrial capitalists. Some wealthy indi-
viduals have perf o rmed as patient capitalists, but they have done so as
v e n t u re capitalists with a view to reaping re t u rns by taking the new
enterprise public once it has become a going concern (Wilson 1986;
Lazonick 1992, 476–482). The most successful venture capitalists,
m o re o v e r, have had a deep knowledge of the technologies being devel-
oped and close relationships with the key developmental personnel.
Once a company has made the transition from new venture to going
c o n c e rn and has become publicly held, the key to continued financial
commitment has been, as we have shown, the dispersion of stockholder
power so that these outsiders to the innovation process, in their quest
for financial liquidity, cannot reduce the corporate retentions that are
the basic source of innovative investment.
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strategic control and when the promise of sustainable pro s p e r i t y
p revailed, institutional investors did provide a degree of financial
commitment by absorbing long-term corporate bond issues at intere s t
rates that financial regulation kept low. This bonded debt was in addition
to, rather than a substitute for, retained earnings. But as pension funds
became increasingly important to the saving strategies of American
households, they were influential in overt h rowing financial re g u l a t i o n
that constrained their ability to extract higher yields on their investment
p o rtfolios (the most important piece of legislation being the Employee
R e t i rement Income Security Act of 1974), and they shifted their port f o-
lios from bonds to stocks in their quest for higher yields. More re c e n t l y,
pension fund managers have been under even more pre s s u re to secure
higher yields on their portfolios as American households have incre a s-
ingly turned to mutual funds to manage their re t i rement saving.
But even if U.S. institutional investors were inclined to be patient capi-
talists, the funds they could supply would not generate sustainable pros-
perity in the absence of a dramatic transformation in the way in which
investments in corporate assets are made. To generate sustainable pros-
perity, strategic decision makers must invest in broader and deeper skill
bases, and to have the incentive and ability to make such investments,
these strategic decision makers must be integrated into the org a n i z a-
tional learning processes for which the broad and deep skill bases form
foundations. In the absence of these conditions, even those corporate
employees who could benefit from investments in org a n i z a t i o n a l
l e a rning are apt, through their pension funds, to demand high re t u rn s
t oday rather than support financial commitment. In the absence of
investments in organizational integration that can enable business enter-
prises to gain sustained competitive advantage, employees do not have
any reason to believe that they will share in the gains of innovation in
the future. 
O rganizational Control versus Stakeholder Contro l
Notwithstanding all the rhetoric about stockholders as residual claimants,
once one recognizes the importance of organizational learning to the
development and utilization of productive re s o u rces, one cannot avoid the
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i m p o rtant investments that an enterprise makes are in human re s o u rc e s ,
not physical re s o u rces. In line with the conventional concept of pro p e rt y,
corporate accounting principles count as expenses both the investments i n
human re s o u rces that take the forms of knowledge and skills and the
returns to human re s o u rces that take the forms of higher incomes, better
benefits, and more stable employment. Although business executives may
be heard to say that human assets are their companies’ most valuable
assets, in corporate law and in accounting practice human capabilities are
not treated as corporate assets because people cannot be owned. The
conventional concept of pro p e rty on which this law and practice are
based, however, ignores the collective assets and collective re t u rns that are
the essential realities of the innovative enterprise. From our perspective—
which one might call an “organizational control” perspective—sustainable
p ro s p e r i t y, be it in the United States or elsewhere, re q u i res not only that
these investments in collective assets be made, but also that those whose
knowledge, skills, and learning are central to the development and utiliza-
tion of these collective assets have the expectation of sharing in the
residual, that is, the gains of innovation. 
With the increased power of stockholders to extract re t u rns from corpora-
tions, a small but growing number of economists and politicians have
a rgued that there are other corporate stakeholders, besides stockholders,
who have a claim to corporate re t u rn s .
1 0 The stakeholder perspective does
not challenge the claims that stockholders are principals; it accepts that
stockholders are residual claimants because they invest in the prod u c t i v e
assets of the enterprise. Rather, the stakeholder perspective argues that
the physical assets in which stockholders allegedly invest are not the only
assets that create value in the corporation. Human assets create value as
well. Individuals invest in their own human assets; to some extent these
human assets are “firm specific” and hence employees make value-
c reating investments in their firm. In allocating corporate re t u rns, the
g o v e rnance of U.S. corporations should recognize the central import a n c e
of these investments in human assets. The employees, along with the
stockholders, should be accorded residual claimant status.
Who should control strategic investment decisions in the corporation? T h e
o rganizational control perspective argues that strategic investment 
decisions should be made by participants in the corporation who are 
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p roducts that are higher in quality and lower in cost than those pre v i-
ously produced. Such strategic integration provides the only basis for
making investment decisions in the face of inherent uncertainty with
any prospect, other than pure luck, of success. Whatever the hierar-
chical stru c t u re of authority and responsibility within the corporation
for committing financial re s o u rces to innovative investment strategies,
those who wield this authority and responsibility must be integrated
into the relevant learning collectivities if they are to have the ability
and incentive to transform inherent uncertainty into sustained compet-
itive advantage.
The stakeholder perspective has no conception of strategic contro l
primarily because it has no theory of the firm other than as a combina-
tion of physical and human assets that for some reason (labeled “firm
specificity”) happen to be gathered together in a particular company. As
in neoclassical economic theory, actual investment decisions are made
by individual actors. The role of corporate governance is to get factor
re t u rns right, so that these individual actors are induced to make the
firm-specific investments that the enterprise requires. Such a perspective
focuses only on the relation between types of investment (physical or
human, general or specific) and returns and hence cannot address how
strategic control over the allocation of resources may or may not result
in innovative investments. 
What types of investments should they make? For the enterprise to remain
innovative, investments must be made in organizational learn i n g
p rocesses that can generate higher- q u a l i t y, lower-cost products than
currently exist. It is inherent in the innovation process that the breadth
and depth of the skills that must be integrated to produce a part i c u l a r
p roduct will change over time as technology develops. The most
dramatic changes in the breadth and depth of organizational learn i n g
processes occur when, as has been the case of the Japanese challenge to
American industry, business enterprises make productive investments in
social environments that favor investments in broader and deeper skill
bases. To promote sustainable prosperity, corporate governance must be
c o n c e rned with investments in social organization that can generate
innovation and competitive advantage. 
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attempt to understand the investments in organizational learning that
make assets specific to a particular collectivity. Marg a ret Blair (1995)
recognizes the need for an analysis of what she calls “wealth creation” in
order to make the case for a corporate governance process that allocates
returns to firm-specific human assets. But she provides no analysis of the
p rocess that generates higher- q u a l i t y, lower-cost products. She assert s
that investment in firm-specific assets can generate “quasi rents” for the
i n v e s t o r, but does not specify under what conditions (technological,
organizational, and competitive) such increased returns are generated or
why they should be specific to a particular company.
How should the re t u rns on these investments be distributed? The org a n i z a-
tional control perspective argues that, to promote sustainable prosperity,
re t u rns must be reinvested in learning collectivities that can generate
sustained competitive advantage. Investments in human assets take the
f o rm of remuneration for those engaged in the organizational learn i n g
processes. The need for financial commitment means that returns under
the control of the organization are foundations for ensuring investment
in learning processes that are collective and cumulative. But the
changing character of the organizational learning processes that can
generate competitive advantage means that cumulative disadvantages
will eventually arise if the units of strategic control do not change
a c c o rd i n g l y. To promote sustainable pro s p e r i t y, corporate govern a n c e
must be concerned not only with allocating returns to those participants
in the enterprise who are engaged in cumulative learning, but also with
ensuring that, in the form of committed finance, control over re t u rn s
devolves to strategic decision makers who are and remain integrated into
the processes of organizational learning. At the same time, to promote
sustainable pro s p e r i t y, corporate governance must be concerned with
limiting the allocation of returns to those interests, such as public stock-
holders, who can exercise claims on corporate returns, but who make no
contribution to the processes of collective and cumulative learning. 
Lacking a concept of strategic decision making and an analysis of the
innovation process, the stakeholder perspective sees re t u rns as attach-
ing to specific human and physical assets and views the claims to these
assets as being based on the investments that individual stockholders
and employees make. The assumptions that both investment in and
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these factors of production are combined in firms, preclude an analysis
of the collective character of corporate investment and corporate
re t u rns. Hence the stakeholder perspective has no analytical basis for
understanding a system of corporate governance that can allocate
re t u rns from existing productive investments to new productive invest-
ments that are collective. To promote sustainable pro s p e r i t y, a system of
corporate governance must facilitate collective decision making
c o n c e rning the allocation of re s o u rces and re t u rn s .
M o re o v e r, the stakeholder perspective has no theoretical basis for ex-
plaining the historical fact that public stockholders are not and have
not been participants in this process of collective investment. Unlike
those who receive re t u rns for engaging in the learning processes that,
with appropriate organizational integration and adequate financial
commitment, can generate new sources of value, stockholders collect
rents on past accumulation. More o v e r, the size of these re n t s — t h e
yields on their stocks—is not dependent on the scarcity value of 
the financial re s o u rces that they control but on their political power 
to lay claim to corporate re t u rns. The stakeholder perspective does not
a d d ress the changes in governance of U.S. corporations, and the gover-
nance of the U.S. economy more generally, that have enabled stock-
holders to increase their political power to extract higher re t u rns. 
Nor does the stakeholder perspective address the implications of 
this historic change for the prospects for sustainable prosperity in the
U.S. economy.
The problems of corporate governance and industrial development are
not resolved by simply advocating that industrial corporations be ru n
for other stakeholders, especially employees, besides stockholders. The
danger is that diff e rent groups who can lay claim to shares of corporate
revenues will, as has increasingly been the case with stockholders,
extract corporate revenues whether or not their contributions to the
generation of these revenues make these re t u rns possible on a sustain-
able basis. The result of the creation of a “stakeholder society” might be
to increase the propensity for major industrial enterprises and the
economy in which they operate to live off the past rather than invest
for the future .
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rate governance system must be based on a theory of the innovative
enterprise. Without such a theory, stakeholder arguments run the risk of
encouraging other groups, besides stockholders, to become claimants to a
given, and even diminishing, pool of returns. To avoid such a political
and economic stalemate re q u i res a conception of how investments in
people working together in organizations can generate the re t u rns in
international competition that make sustainable prosperity possible. To
make constructive contributions to the corporate governance debate,
economists must shed the shackles—both methodological and ideolog-
ical—of a dominant theoretical orientation that was never designed to
understand how an economy develops. They must build their own capa-
bilities for analyzing the processes of industrial innovation, international
competition, and the social foundations of sustainable prosperity .
N o t e s
1.  In March 1996, in the aftermath of the much publicized termination of
40,000 employees at AT&T and Patrick Buchanan’s attack on the “corpo-
rate hit men,” The New York Ti m e s ran a series of articles under the title
“The Downsizing of America,” which was subsequently released as a book
with the same title.
2.  For a well-known example—General Motors in the 1980s—see Ingrassia
and White 1994.
3.  For a detailed case study of a failed conglomerate acquisition, see Holland
1984. See also Lazonick and West 1995.
4.  On the evolution of stock-based re w a rds in the compensation of U.S.
corporate executives, see Lazonick 1992, 461–466.
5.  The most vigorous proponent of the stockholder perspective in the United
States has been Michael C. Jensen, an economist by training and a professor
of finance at Harvard Business School. See, for example, Jensen 1986, 1989,
1993. See also Scharfstein 1988.
6.  For a broad critique of the fiction of the market economy as propounded by
neoclassical economists, see Lazonick 1991. For a characterization of the
innovation process and a critique of theories of corporate governance that
ignore this process, see O’Sullivan 1997.
7.  For Schumpeter’s perspective on innovation and the corporate enterprise,
see Lazonick 1991, chap. 4.
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States has been Michael E. Porter, an economist by training and a professor
of strategy at Harvard Business School. See Porter 1990, 1992.
9.  For a critique of Porter’s failure to recognize the importance of organization
for innovation and competitive advantage even as he presents material that
describes organizational learning processes, see Lazonick 1993. 
10.  In the academic arena the most articulate proponent of the stakeholder
perspective has been Marg a ret Blair, an economist by training, a form e r
j o u rnalist, and a re s e a rch fellow at the Brookings Institution (see Blair
1995). In the U.S. political arena the most vigorous proponent of the stake-
holder perspective has been Robert B. Reich, a lawyer by training and
recently secretary of labor (see Reich 1996). In his academic work, written
in the years prior to his appointment to a position in the Clinton adminis-
tration, Reich adopted the position that upgrading the skills of the
American labor force could proceed without intervening in the governance
of U.S. industrial corporations (Reich 1990, 1991). For a critique of Reich’s
views in this work, see Lazonick 1993. 
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